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A tactical retreat? Conceptualising the dynamics European grocery retail 
divestment from East Asia. 
 
Abstract 
The internationalisation of the firm is a highly dynamic process, in which periods of 
investment and expansion intermingle with periods of divestment and retrenchment. 
Academic research to date has focused on identifying the reasons for and the 
processes of divestment.  Empirical studies either evidence generic pressures or 
provide case studies of specific incidents.  There few longitudinal studies of 
international divestment, consequently the dynamic interactions between host market, 
home market and firm level factors, and how the institutional context changes over 
time is underplayed.  This paper seeks to rectify this gap in our understanding. 
We explore the rationale and evolving dynamics of European grocery retail divestment 
in East Asia over a thirty year period.  Taking an inductive approach and drawing on 
analysis of contemporary narratives drawn from company documentation, trade 
journals, newsfeeds and market reports, three phases can be identified characterised 
by specific factors and combinations of factors which intersect to provide the key 
pressures and stimuli for divestment.  We conclude that at different time periods, 
different internal and external contextual influences manifest themselves through 
different priorities within the firm’s strategy - marked by a switch from local (host) 
market, to regional, to global firm-centric considerations. Longitudinal analyses allow 
a greater recognition of this dynamic interplay of factors, and the changes in these 
relationships, and provides a more nuanced understanding of the international 
divestment process. 
 
Keywords 
Divestment, grocery retailing, East Asia, market adjustment, market resistance, 
corporate reconfiguration 
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A tactical retreat? Conceptualising the dynamics of European grocery retail 
divestment from East Asia. 
 
Introduction 
In the academic literature on retailing, internationalisation is commonly portrayed as 
an attractive strategic option for the firm.  As the globalisation of the retail industry 
continues apace, the focus of research has been on identifying the critical success 
factors and key competencies that allow retailers to successfully embed themselves 
in local markets.  However, at the level of the individual firm, retail internationalisation 
is in a constant state of flux, with divestment and re-adjustment of international 
portfolios a common feature.   
In our efforts to theorise the retail internationalisation process, the emphasis has been 
on market entry and expansion, rather than on withdrawal and divestment. Within the 
existing literature we have tended to simply identify and categorise the generic 
pressures that lead to divestment, rather than explore the changing interactions 
between these factors and the firm.  The need for a broader conceptualisation of the 
divestment process, and one which recognises the changing dynamics between the 
different factors driving exit decisions over time, presents a gap in our current 
understanding.   
In this paper, we aim to address this gap in our knowledge.  We do this by examining 
the patterns of investment and divestment by European grocery retailers in East Asia 
over the past thirty years.  During this period, thirteen of Europe’s leading grocery 
retailers entered eleven different countries in the region.  Once viewed as highly 
attractive retail markets with great potential for future growth, recent high-profile 
 4 
 
withdrawals raise questions about this strategy and future investment.  We focus on 
market withdrawals and the underlying rationale(s) provided for these actions at the 
time. Assessment of these patterns and pressures allows us to identify how the 
evolving intersection of home and host market dynamics influence the decision making 
of retail firms. 
The paper is organised as follows.  First, we provide a brief review of the literature on 
international retail divestment to identify the gaps in our current understanding that we 
seek to address.  We then explain the approach and sources used in our investigation. 
Patterns of entry, in-country investment and market withdrawal are explored to set the 
context for the main contribution of the paper, which considers retrenchment and 
divestment activities over the study period and their relationship with the wider 
operational environment in more detail.  
Literature Review  
Benito and Welch (1997: 9) define international divestment as “voluntary or forced 
actions that reduce a company’s engagement in or exposure to cross-border 
activities”. Benito (2005: 247) further concludes that: “Divestments are an integral part 
of business.  They can be seen as the results of ever-evolving processes of change 
that keep companies and whole economies rejuvenated and in shape”.  Retailing is 
no different from any other economic sector in this respect.   Several frameworks for 
explaining international retail divestment have emerged in the literature. Drawing on 
perspectives originally devised for manufacturing (for example Tornedon, 1975; 
Boddewyn, 1983, 1985; Benito, 1997, 2005), these have then been adapted to the 
specificities of the retail sector.  
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International divestment research has sought to establish the reasons for failure (why) 
and the process of divestment (how).  Boddewyn (1983, 1985) distinguished between 
the conditions, motives and the precipitating circumstances which provide the 
trigger(s) for divestment.  Common contributing factors included the stability and 
predictability of the host environment, operational performance (both internationally 
and domestically), the strategic fit of the foreign operation, senior management 
changes, and governance issues.  The relative emphasis placed on these criteria is in 
part determined by the choice of an underlying conceptual perspective (Benito & 
Welch, 1997).  The economic perspective views divestment as a reaction to changing 
economic conditions which impact on financial performance, the strategic 
management perspective regards divestment as a part of a fluid portfolio of activities 
responding to life cycle considerations, and the internationalisation management 
perspective highlights the barriers to withdrawal arising from inertia generated by the 
firm’s level of international commitment and length of time in the market. These 
different perspectives provide an underlying conceptual position with respect to 
divestment, but are assumed to be static and there is no consideration of if these 
positions evolve and change over time. 
This emphasis on establishing motives and mechanisms also underpins work in the 
retail sector. Burt et al. (2003) categorised international divestment in retailing as 
failure, defined as the unplanned underperformance of a firm, arising from four 
interlinked sources.  First, market failure occurs when the market does not ‘behave’ as 
expected and consequently projections of market growth and profitability are not met. 
Changes in economic, political, regulatory and social conditions create a level of 
market instability impairing performance. Second, competitive failure arises when 
operational performance does not match that of local competitors or competitors react 
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and compete more effectively than anticipated.  Third, operational failure relates to the 
transferability of the domestic business model and ways of operating, and occurs when 
domestic skills, concepts and managerial approaches integral to the business model 
do not fit well in the host market environment or are resisted by key stakeholders.  
Finally, business failure can be diagnosed when decisions impacting upon the 
international business are made because of changing circumstances (performance, 
stakeholder expectations etc.) within the wider organisation.  These circumstances 
may arise in the domestic business and\or in other international operations.  
While the subsequent closure of stores or country exit is commonly regarded as 
‘failure’, divestment may also be a positive strategic action. Alexander and Quinn 
(2002: 121) emphasised that divestment does not always reflect an inherent weakness 
on the part of the international retailer, and may occur for other strategic reasons: “it 
is easier to divest international operations than it is for an international company to 
divest domestic operations when trading conditions are poor”.  Palmer (2004) framed 
divestment within a broader context of four pro-active modes of organisational 
restructuring: financial restructuring, relating to changes in governance structures and 
stakeholder expectations; portfolio restructuring, arising from merger and acquisition 
activity and alliances or joint ventures; organisational restructuring, reflecting changes 
in company structure, processes or management; and spatial restructuring, requiring 
changes in the geographical scope and scale of activity. Finally, Cairns et al. (2008, 
2010) also distinguished between ‘corporate crisis’ divestment – characterised by a 
lack of stability or focus amongst leadership and problems away from the host market 
which stimulate a need to refocus on the domestic market – and ‘positive restructuring’ 
divestment characterised as an ongoing process of revitalisation and renewal through 
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organisational learning which may lead to new formats or approaches better suited to 
internationalisation.   
Empirical research into international retail divestment has explored these themes.  
Although retail divestments were noted in some studies exploring the overall patterns 
of internationalisation activity (Hollander, 1970; Burt, 1993; Knee, 1993; Godley & 
Fletcher, 2001) it was not until the mid-2000s that divestment became a significant 
focus of empirical work.  In the European grocery sector, for instance, Burt et al. (2004) 
examined divestment activity from 1970-2004, while Alexander et al. (2005) explored 
divestment in several sectors over the 1987-2003 period.  These macro level studies 
found that: international retail divestment took several forms, although country exit 
dominated; different divestment and exit rates were found for different countries and 
regions; and most divestments were relatively small scale (less than 40 stores) and 
occurred within 10 years of entry.  Sector level reviews have been supported by more 
interpretive case studies, typically focussing on specific divestment incidents, for 
example, Marks and Spencer (Burt et al., 2002; Jackson et al., 2005; Mellahi et al., 
2002), Tesco (Palmer, 2004; Coe  et al., 2017), Home Depot (Bianchi & Arnold, 2004), 
Sainsbury (El-Amir & Burt, 2007), Ahold (Wrigley & Currah, 2003; Palmer & Quinn, 
2007), Wal-Mart (Christopherson, 2007; Kim, 2008; and Gandolfi & Strach, 2009), Aldi 
(Sikordili, 2013)  and Target (Yoder et al., 2016).   
The triggers for divestment and the processes of divestment in international retailing 
are therefore multi-faceted.  Whilst a range of contributing factors and options are 
identified in existing frameworks, these are largely static representations.  The focus 
on individual divestment incidents tends to highlight specific circumstances at a single 
point in time. We therefore contend that this leaves gaps in our understanding.  First, 
the emphasis tends to be on a specific trigger or set of triggers and the response this 
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generates (i.e. divestment activity).  The wider environmental setting and institutional 
context, including both domestic and host market factors, is often underplayed and the 
complexity of interactions and relationships between these factors and the firm is 
understated.  Second, the limited number of longitudinal studies mean that the 
underlying dynamic nature of divestment over time is not well theorised.  Over the 
period that a firm has been operating in a market, the contextual conditions evolve, for 
instance in terms of the economic setting, socio-political policy responses and the 
nature of local competition. These changing dynamics add complexity to the 
internationalisation process and determine priorities and strategic actions reflected in 
investment decisions and managerial commitment.   Addressing these two gaps 
provides our theoretical contribution to the current understanding of the retail 
divestment process. 
Approach and Methodology 
A common theme throughout the June 2011 special issue of the Journal of 
International Business Studies was the importance of understanding the broader 
context to corporate decision making, thereby drawing on Sayer’s (1992) contention 
that “making sense of events requires that we ‘contextualize’ them in some way”. 
Welch et al (2011) pointed to the tensions between context and ‘robust’ scientific 
explanation, and make the case for contextual explanation - recognising that 
explanations require an understanding of the conditions under which they operate and 
emerge as they are placed within social time and social space. In the same issue, 
Burgelman (2011) also argued the case for longitudinal research to bridge the gap 
between descriptive historical narratives which focus on case studies of particular, 
experiential, social phenomenon and quantitative reductionist models which seek to 
 9 
 
develop abstract models for testing.  These perspectives underpin our research design 
and approach. 
By examining divestment actions over a thirty year period within a single industrial 
sector we provide a longitudinal study of the contextual pressures for divestment and 
how these pressures persist, combine and diminish over time.  This approach allows 
us to explore the gaps we have identified in the literature. The choice of a single sector 
(grocery retailing) and region (East Asia) provides “case” boundaries for the study, 
allowing a highly visible and numerically manageable set of actions to be observed 
and analysed.  Primary research into divestment has its challenges as it carries an 
implicit stigma.  Divestments are often wiped from corporate memory, rarely featuring 
in company literature, and management teams and those involved in the decision-
making process “move on”.  Even if individuals can be contacted their recollections or 
rationales for past decisions can be retro-fitted to suit post-event re-evaluations, rather 
than provide accounts of decisions and contextual pressures at the time. 
Consequently, the interpretations presented in this paper are based upon 
contemporary narratives reported in secondary sources, primarily published company 
documents and press reports issued during the period under consideration. Data is 
also drawn from the retail trade press and retail-related newsfeed services over the 
period.  Additionally, we draw on the wider academic literature on retailing and retail 
internationalisation in the East Asian region.   
As most of the European retailers involved are publicly quoted the authors hold copies 
of Annual Reports for these companies throughout the whole study period.  Relevant 
press releases and other company communications relating to strategy and 
operational decisions also exist to supplement this material.  Commentary on the 
activities of these retailers in East Asian markets has also been collated from the 
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leading domestic market trade press including LSA and Points de Vente (France), 
Distribution d’Aujhourd’hui (Belgium), Lebensmittel Zeitung and Lebensmittel Praxis 
(Germany), the Grocer and Retail Week (UK), and regional publications such as 
European Supermarket News and Retail Asia.  Over the period the authors also have 
held subscriptions to commercial retail news services such as those provided by 
Management Horizons, IGD, M+M\Planet Retail, Retail Newsletter (IADS) and Japan 
Consuming, amongst others, and have had access to a variety of country and 
company profiles from Corporate Intelligence, Retail Knowledgebank, Euromonitor, 
Mintel and similar providers.  These secondary sources have spanned the period in 
question and provide contemporary narratives relating to actions espoused by the firm 
or commentators at the time.  These items have been used to populate a database 
recording the activities of European grocery retailers in international markets.   
From this material divestment activities in the region were identified along with the 
contemporary commentary on these actions.  These are summarised in tables 1-3.  
The authors independently assessed this material and identified common themes and 
rationales within the narratives.  These themes were then used to determine the key 
pressures and categorise the dominant divestment pressures alongside the focus and 
motives for divestment from the perspective of the individual firm. From this inductive 
process, three relatively distinct and coherent phases of divestment were derived (as 
presented in table 4) and are used to frame the presentation of the empirical analysis 
that follows. 
Findings 
The operational involvement of European grocery retailers in the major markets of 
East Asia presents a familiar fluid and discontinuous pattern of multiple market entries 
by several retailers across the region, an approach often labelled ‘flag planting’, 
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followed by a period of consolidation leading to a reduction in the number of operators 
per market.   
European grocery retailers first entered the region in 1977 when a Japanese 
wholesaler joined the Spar voluntary group.  The large chains arrived in 1989 when 
Makro opened its cash-and-carry format in Thailand and Taiwan, and Carrefour 
introduced the hypermarket to Taiwan. The peak of entry activity occurred in the late 
1990s, when the first movers were joined by other cash-and-carry operators (Metro 
and Booker), hypermarket chains (Auchan, Promodès, Casino and Tesco), and the 
supermarkets of Ahold and Delhaize.  Contemporary company and commentator 
narratives point to a combination of rapidly expanding populations and 
underdeveloped retail markets as providing the general motives for investment -  a 
justification provided by Ahold, with reference to entering Malaysia, China, Singapore, 
Thailand and Indonesia between 1996 and 1997: 
“ Our existing Asian ventures and others on the way should help power our 
Group’s growth over the next decade by enabling Ahold to benefit from the 
region’s rapid economic growth and the emergence of a value and 
convenience orientated middle class of hundreds of millions” …(Ahold Annual 
Report, 1996: 9) 
 
and Casino when entering Taiwan: 
 
“As a major Asian economic center with a population of 24 million with a high 
purchasing power, Taiwan offers strong guarantees of profitability coupled 
with manageable levels of risk” (Casino Annual Report, 1997: 27) 
 
The explosion of interest in the late 1990s was, however, primarily fuelled by the Asian 
economic crisis which coincided with a period when European retailers were cash rich 
(Wrigley, 2000).    Asian partners needed to raise capital or reduce commitments and 
moved into joint venture deals with European partners, as illustrated by Ahold, Casino 
and Delhaize in Thailand (Tosonboon, 2003) and Tesco in South Korea (Suh & 
Howard, 2009).  Entry plans were further accelerated as barriers to foreign investment 
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were removed, real estate costs fell, and local firms actively sought to raise cash by 
selling assets: 
“Economic and currency turmoil in this region impacted our start-up activities 
but also presented us with unexpected acquisition opportunities, allowing us 
to accelerate our development timetable” (Ahold Annual Report, 1997: 7) 
 
After the turn of the century market entry was concentrated on “new” markets such as 
Japan and Vietnam, alongside the relatively late expansion of Tesco’s portfolio of 
Asian markets (Wood et al., 2016).  
Once in a market the pace of expansion depended on local conditions and the ability 
of the foreign retailer to secure sites and appropriate permissions.  Most in-country 
expansion was organic and expansion of the store portfolio via acquisition was limited 
reflecting relatively few suitable acquisition targets particularly within large store 
formats.  Casino’s acquisition of Carrefour’s 42 stores in Thailand during 2001 was the 
largest takeover by a European based grocery retailer in the region, followed by 
Tesco’s acquisition of E-Land’s 36 South Korean hypermarkets in 2008.   The latter 
was seen as an important boost to store expansion: 
“This acquisition of high quality assets is an important strategic move, which 
will allow us to accelerate our growth in this key market and deliver a much 
stronger offer for customers as we convert the stores to Homeplus” (Tesco 
Press Release, 14/05/2008).   
Elsewhere beyond a handful of takeovers involving 20-30 stores in the supermarket 
format, growth through in-country acquisition involved individual or small numbers of 
stores changing hands. 
By the start of 2015 over 4,600 grocery stores including nearly 1,300 hypermarkets 
were operated by well-established European grocery retailers across the region. The 
prime foci in terms of store numbers were the large markets of China, South Korea 
and Thailand. The early reliance on large store formats such as the hypermarket and 
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cash-and-carry was eclipsed by the subsequent expansion of smaller scale formats, 
particularly the convenience store, from the mid-2000s.  These formats were 
especially prevalent in Thailand and South Korea driven by the multi-format approach 
of Casino and Tesco whilst in China, DIA (initially introduced when part of Carrefour) 
established a chain of around 400 limited line discount stores.  
There has, however, been considerable churn in the presence of European grocery 
retailers in East Asia with periods of retrenchment (Figure 1) including withdrawals 
from individual markets and the complete exit of Ahold, Booker, SHV\Makro and 
Casino from the region. By mid-2016 the 53 country entries (i.e. market entry by a 
different retailer) were mirrored by 38 country exits.  Whilst thirteen exits (slightly 
skewed by three exits relating to the disappearance of Promodès as an independent 
operator following the merger with Carrefour in 1999) occurred within 5 years of entry, 
the mean for the length of time in a market before exit was 8.8 years (or 9.5 excluding 
the Promodès\Carrefour merger), with SHV\Makro trading in Thailand for 24 years 
before departing.  This suggests that investments in East Asia are given sufficient time 
to prosper, and compares favourably with the 4-6 years before exit by European 
grocery retailers in all markets noted by Burt et al. (2004). The majority (20) of exits 
for which the outcome is known (34) involved the acquisition of the operation by a local 
or regional (i.e. East Asian) operator, and nine exits involved transfers between 
Western (including American) retailers, although three of these comprise the 
Carrefour-Promodès deal. In addition to country exit, strategic readjustments reflecting 
a reduced willingness or ability to commit financial and management resources to 
further expansion have seen some retailers, such as Tesco in China and Carrefour in 
Indonesia, retain a presence in the region but with lower levels of equity and 
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managerial commitment (Tesco Press Release, 09/09/2013, 02/10/2013; Carrefour 
Press Release 20/11/2012). 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
In general terms, the spread of markets, drivers for involvement and entry methods 
employed by European grocery retailers in East Asia over the past 30 years reflect the 
factors and patterns commonly observed in the general retail internationalisation 
literature.  Also clearly evident is the importance of serendipity during the regional 
financial crisis of the late 1990s.  Over time, however, there has been a rationalisation 
of market presence, often after a substantial period of trading in the market, and 
typically through disposal of operations to local or regional players.  This overall macro 
perspective, however, disguises the degree of variety found within the divestment 
process over time from which three relatively distinct phases can be discerned.  When 
these three phases are explored in more detail, the dynamism of international retail 
divestment activity becomes more evident.  These three phases appear to exhibit 
different characteristics and decisions can be attributed to changing contextual 
pressures and challenges over time.  Recognition of this fluidity and the dynamic 
interactions involved is currently absent from theorisations of divestment in the 
literature. 
Phase 1: Pioneer Adjustment (1998-2001) 
The first divestment phase (Table 1) comprises eight country exits by six different 
companies plus the merger of Promodès with Carrefour, which saw the Continent 
tradename disappear as the outlets in three markets were rebranded.  Most 
divestments in this period can be characterised as an initial re-adjustment to market 
entry. As withdrawals in this period followed relatively soon after entry (a mean of 2.4 
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years in the market), most divestments were of small scale operations in terms of store 
numbers except for Ahold’s supermarket networks in China and Singapore which 
involved 40 and 14 stores respectively.  Withdrawal also occurred whilst these 
companies were actively pursuing entry into other markets in the region, supporting 
an interpretation that this represented early stage adjustments to operating in distant 
and diverse markets: 
“The Asian market is huge, diverse and far away. Setting up operations there 
is a long and challenging process” (Carrefour Annual Report, 1994: 18) 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
This period, which we categorise as a “pioneer adjustment” phase, captures the initial 
reaction to emerging internationalisation strategies in the region.  The opportunism 
and serendipity characterising many market entries during the regional economic crisis 
meant that new entrants were often faced with unexpected and under-researched 
consumer, competitive and legislative norms.  These pressures disrupted preferred 
business models and posed unanticipated challenges which increased costs.  With 
opportunities emerging elsewhere in the region, and companies keen to exploit first 
mover advantages, the decision to depart rather than invest resources in attempting 
to grow scale and compete was often the preferred option. 
Attempts to grow scale quickly were often frustrated by limited acquisition 
opportunities, placing a focus on organic expansion. As Carrefour noted: 
“rapid expansion in this part of the world depends on the availability of suitable 
locations, as current regulation and astronomical real estate prices hinder the 
full-scale development of our retailing formula” (Carrefour Annual Report, 
1990: 13) 
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Difficulties in accessing sites for large stores provided an unwelcome break on 
expansion, and encouraged opportunistic behaviours as chains sought to build store 
networks and secure dominant market positions.  China provides a well-documented 
example of ‘game playing’ reactions as the market opened to foreign investment 
(Wang, 2009; 2014; Fels, 2009; Tacconelli & Wrigley, 2009; Chuang et al., 2011; and 
Zhang & Wei, 2015).  For foreign retailers the expansion process was at times seen 
as being painfully slow:   
“from the beginning the Chinese government has been cautious, moving 
along with a deliberate sequence: from single-store operations to retail 
chains, and from joint ventures to whole foreign ownership” (Wang, 2003: 
118).   
 
Although European grocery retailers adapted their expansion strategies to circumvent 
regulatory constraints, frustrations with the legal environment and the ability to 
compete fairly were often expressed on exit. Planning legislation restricting the pace 
of expansion was cited when Auchan sold its single store in Thailand and Carrefour 
its four stores in Hong Kong.  Carrefour complained about the difficulty of finding 
suitable sites as urban development laws were “very restrictive for retail” (South China 
Morning Post: 30/08/2000).  Local commentators also alleged that leading incumbent 
retailers such as ParknShop (Hutchinson Whampoa) and Wellcome (Jardine 
Matheson) exerted their influence with local stakeholders to block access to sites and 
discouraged suppliers from dealing with Carrefour.  An enquiry by the Hong Kong 
Consumer Council found that seven of the twenty-two suppliers investigated admitted 
enforcing a minimum resale price on Carrefour (Zhen, 2007).  These actions raised 
the costs of operating in Hong Kong: “where our expansion was limited and would not 
provide the desired profitability” (Carrefour AR, 2000: 15).  Similarly, Ahold felt that 
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during the late 1990s the Chinese government was acting as both regulator and 
competitor, thereby distorting competition (Palmer & Quinn, 2007). 
Early entrants also faced operational challenges from differences in how supply chains 
worked and in other norms of market behaviour.  A common issue on entry was the 
local channel infrastructure which raised several challenges for the established cost 
structures of the European grocery chains’ operating models.  In most East Asian 
countries, the supply chain, particularly for fresh produce, operated through several 
layers of wholesalers and agencies.  Additionally, infrastructure shortcomings meant 
that cool chains were underdeveloped or non-existent so stock levels had to be 
increased to allow for inefficient distribution systems. Investment was therefore 
required to guarantee supply, to improve production efficiency and ensure the quality 
and consistency of local fresh produce.  Soon after entry into China and Thailand, for 
instance, Ahold had to open fresh food processing centres in Shanghai and Bangkok 
and throughout the region European grocery retailers invested heavily in distribution 
centres and hubs (Ahold Annual Report, 1997; 1998: Delhaize Annual Report, 1998).  
These investments required sunk costs in infrastructure that had not been anticipated 
at entry.  
The perceived competitive advantage of the incoming retailers revolved around their 
ability to introduce modern retail techniques. The European grocery offer, irrespective 
of format, focused on competitive prices combined with ‘western’ quality, hygiene and 
service levels,but in virtually all cases we find examples of adaptations involving the 
widening of fresh produce ranges and attempts to replicate or compete with the 
atmosphere of wet markets, as illustrated by Tesco:  
“we have brought to these businesses (Thailand) our high service standards 
and specialist skills in retailing” (Tesco Annual Report, 1999: 14),  
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and Delhaize: 
“The Asian companies of the group developed an “Every Day Low Prices” 
policy, offering their customers fresh produce at the same prices as the 
traditional open-air wet markets” (Delhaize Annual Report 2001:9).  
 
Additionally, strong regional differences in food cultures required a localised response, 
especially in the larger markets, as Carrefour noted in China:  
“The broad presence requires enormous commercial adaptation: the distance 
between Peking and Shanghai is the same as between Copenhagen and 
Malaga, and consumer habits are just as diverse!” (Carrefour Annual Report, 
2000: 21). 
 
Most European based grocery retailers in East Asia initially traded through their core 
domestic formats, which were new and innovative in the region on entry.  The French 
retailers Carrefour, Auchan and Casino entered with the hypermarket format, 
SHV\Makro and Metro via the cash and carry, and Ahold, Delhaize and Spar 
developed supermarkets.    Adaptations soon followed as operators sought to adjust 
their concepts to highly congested and densely populated urban settings. For 
example, on entry into Taiwan, Carrefour had commented on how their store had been 
“specially developed to suit the high density urban conditions of that market” 
(Carrefour Annual Report,1988:1).   Asian purchase food daily owing to perceptions 
of freshness and in smaller volumes due to limited domestic storage capacity.  This 
conflicted directly with the low price-bulk buy premise of the hypermarket format.  
Higher population densities, the cost of real estate and the use of motorcycles rather 
than cars encouraged changes to the physical configuration of the European Asian 
hypermarket. Auchan, Carrefour, Casino, Metro and Tesco all launched smaller-sized 
“compact” or multi-level versions of the hypermarket in downtown locations as they 
sought to embed themselves in the local market.  Most hypermarket chains, 
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particularly those operating in China, later added shopping malls renting space to local 
and foreign non-food retailers.   
Whilst to some extent the hypermarket adapted, the cash-and-carry and supermarket 
formats struggled for acceptance.  Fierce competition from well-established wholesale 
networks supporting the fragmented small shop sector and the limitations on bulk 
purchases by private customers due to transport and storage constraints, hindered 
expansion.  In the case of the supermarket, the Ahold strategy was based on the 
premise of turning around existing stores through European management practices 
but the stores acquired in China were in poor locations, too small and could not 
compete with hypermarkets on price or range.  
Finally, during this initial divestment phase the regional economic crisis proved to be 
a double-edged sword; whilst generating expansion opportunities it also raised trading 
challenges.  Recessionary pressures depressed sales to varying degrees focusing 
attention on prices, cost control and efficiency to maintain performance.  In this 
economic climate, profitability was often sacrificed to maintain and grow sales. These 
pressures coincided with the initial post-entry phase when European retailers were 
seeking to invest to expand store numbers and floorspace to achieve scale.  A year 
before their departure from China and Singapore Ahold had signalled caution: 
“.. we expect markets to emerge from the crisis in due course and again 
generate economic growth.  However, until we see this happening, we will 
tread cautiously by controlling costs and strengthening current positions” 
(Ahold Annual Report, 1998: 6). 
which then became reality: 
“we have restructured our regional operations and divested our loss-making 
operations in China and Singapore …. they generated insufficient economies 
of scale, would have needed considerable new investment over a longer 
period of time and, even then, had no real prospect of becoming profitable” 
(Ahold Annual Report, 2000: 12, 31).   
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Phase 2: Resistance and Market Consolidation (2003-2008) 
A second divestment phase during the mid-2000’s comprised fifteen exits involving 
seven companies (Table 2). Most of these divestments involved established 
businesses, as the mean length of time in the market was 8.3 years, with most 
operating in the region for at least five years, and six having been in the market for 
over a decade.  Compared to the previous period and reflecting the greater degree of 
longevity in the market, these divestments were typically of more substantive 
businesses in terms of store numbers.  When these market exits are considered in a 
wider regional context these actions may be seen as part of a broader strategy led 
market consolidation process as retailers departed from some markets but remained 
in others:   
“Several major international players have exited what have been for them 
non-performing businesses.  Swapping of assets has been a feature from 
time to time in this process. Makro is also focused on building stronger 
positions in selected markets as opposed to seeking a presence in an 
extended number of countries” (SHV\Makro Annual Report, 2007: 20). 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
Rationalisation of market portfolios saw, for example, Tesco exchange its six 
Taiwanese stores for the Carrefour stores in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
(although the latter was blocked by the Slovak authorities), and Delhaize and 
SHV\Makro retrench to a single Asian market, whilst Casino focused on its Big C 
operation in Thailand and Vietnam.  Ahold left the region completely, departing from 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand when it became mired in a group financial scandal 
which surfaced in early 2003.  Part of the recovery plan led by former IKEA CEO 
Anders Moberg required the disposal of “non-core” assets in East Asia and Latin 
America (Ahold Annual Report, 2002) 
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A characteristic of this period was the emergence (or re-emergence) of strong 
indigenous and regional operators recovering from the regional recession.  For 
instance, the Hong Kong based Dairy Farm International acquired the supermarkets 
of Ahold and Delhaize in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore via its local market 
subsidiaries and the Lotte Group (South Korea) purchased SHV\Makro’s Chinese and 
Indonesian stores to convert them to hypermarkets and boost their own regional 
international ambitions.  A spokesman for Lotte stated at the time that: 
“The discount store market in Korea is going to be saturated in the near future.  
This acquisition signals the company’s participation in the rapidly developing 
retail sector in Asia” (Korean Joongang Daily, 8/10/2008).   
 
In-country consolidation led by indigenous retailers saw the Central Group absorb the 
Ahold and Delhaize supermarkets in Thailand, Far-Eastern buy out Casino’s 50 
percent share in their 14 Taiwanese hypermarkets, SHV\Makro’s Indonesian partner 
SM Investments acquire their 15 cash-and-carry outlets, and E-Land purchase 
Carrefour’s 31 hypermarkets in South Korea for €1.5billion. This expansion by regional 
operators was often a proactive move, as seen in the purchase of Delhaize’s 
ShopnSave chain in Singapore by local competitor Cold Storage (part of Dairy Farm 
International): 
“We have been pleased with our partnership in Singapore and with the 
progress of our banner there.  The attractive purchase proposal from Dairy 
Farm allows Delhaize Group to generate additional cash and to refocus on 
our original Asian ventures in Thailand and Indonesia” (Delhaize Press 
Release, 14/11/2003). 
  
The emergence of strong domestic and regional players reflected a growing resistance 
to the European grocery retailers and their ways of operating.  This was also evident 
in the re-regulation of the retail sector, primarily targeted at Western retailers and 
intended to protect local operators, and in resistance from within the supply chain to 
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‘foreign’ operational practices and from other stakeholders and opinion formers (Coe 
& Bok, 2014).  
Regulatory conditions are a major consideration in retail internationalisation, and can 
be an important form of protection for prevailing retailing systems and structures. 
There is a significant body of academic literature by regional authors concerning the 
changing focus of public policy towards foreign retailers across East Asia and 
providing examples of regulatory change. Until the mid-1990s, with the exceptions of 
Hong Kong and Singapore, most retail markets in East Asia were either directly or 
indirectly protected from foreign entrants through regulations which controlled the 
nature and extent of foreign direct investment, imports and capital flows, and in some 
cases the opening of large stores and other operational practices (Davies, 1993).  
Formal barriers to foreign ownership in retailing were largely removed during the latter 
part of the 1990s as countries sought WTO membership.  These moves, alongside the 
Asian economic crisis, stimulated market entry but disguised deeper rooted 
institutional challenges.  As in Western markets, following vocal lobbying by local 
stakeholders, the regulatory focus soon switched towards attempts to mitigate the 
impact of large stores and ‘foreign competition’ on local retailers and suppliers, through 
land use legislation and competition laws. The long-term challenge for national 
governments was summed up by Mutebi (2007: 366): 
“Essentially policy makers have to balance the conflicting goals of seeking to 
promote trade competitiveness with defending the interests of local firms, 
interest-groups and consumers in the various urban environments.”  
 
In Malaysia, zoning laws were applied to large store development in 2002, limiting 
them to larger urban areas and prohibiting store openings within 3.5km of housing 
areas or city centres.  Applications for new large format stores had to give two years 
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notice, provide a local impact study, and were to be freestanding developments 
providing business opportunities for ‘interested traders’ at (unspecified) ‘reasonable 
rates’ (Mutebi, 2007).  From January 2004 new foreign owned and large stores were 
forbidden for five years in the Klang Valley, Johor Bahru and Penang.  In Thailand, 
town planning zones were enforced from 2003 and extended to the remaining 
provinces from Bangkok.  Aimed at hypermarkets, these regulations affected both 
domestic and foreign retailers.  More overtly, in 2006, the ‘Confederation of Thais 
Opposing Foreign Retailers’ was founded and, in a highly volatile political 
environment, the Commerce Ministry requested a moratorium on all store openings 
whilst new legislation was drafted.   The subsequent legislation created the national 
Retail and Wholesale Supervision Committee which gave local governments the 
authority to approve new stores in order for local concerns to be heard.  
The European cash-and-carry operators in China had initially found expansion 
constrained by the slower liberalisation of wholesaling compared to retailing. Despite 
announcing plans for “speedy expansion” after entering in 1996, Metro took over three 
years to gain a national wholesale licence “after protracted negotiations” (Metro AG 
Annual Report, 1996; 1999).  A company interviewee quoted in Siebers (2011) 
complained that expansion was also held back by German diligence and a culture of 
compliance as they followed the rules “unlike the French” – a direct reference to the 
opportunistic tactics of Carrefour and Auchan.  Similarly, although SHV\Makro opened 
in Guangzhou (Guangdong province) in 1996 and Beijing in 1997 they only obtained 
a national licence in 2002.  The Guangdong stores were sold the following year before 
departing China entirely in 2007, with only four outlets to show after eleven years of 
operation (SHV\Makro Annual Report, 2007: 21).   
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Resistance to the operating practices of the European grocery retailers was also 
evident in supply chain behaviours, often encouraged by the leading indigenous 
retailers. Elements of the ‘lean distribution’ processes underpinning the Western 
grocery model were difficult to replicate in most East Asian markets. Carrefour faced 
numerous challenges, often leading to high profile disputes with suppliers, as it 
attempted to introduce new ways of working.  Problems arose as it attempted to 
replicate some of its fundamental operating principles in the Japanese market – not 
least maintaining control over its own merchandising and pricing (Larke, 2004).  
Dealing directly with suppliers was not feasible in Japan, where procurement, logistics 
and inventory were managed through a series of intermediaries who performed more 
retail support services such as in-store display and inventory management than was 
the norm in Europe. Some major Japanese food manufacturers refused to deal with 
Carrefour, so many leading brands were unavailable when the first store opened 
(Baek, 2004), and the CEO of the largest liquor wholesaler was publicly quoted as 
saying he would only deal with Carrefour if the Japanese retailers AEON and Ito-
Yokado did not object (Larke & Causton, 2005).   
The decentralisation of buying in the Carrefour business model also encouraged a 
range of ‘informal’ payments in China and Taiwan.  Several staff in Beijing were 
arrested during 2007 for accepting bribes from suppliers and in both countries the 
buying process was subsequently centralised to counter these practices.  Tensions 
arose around fees and rebate structures in China as charges for shelf slots, display 
and promotional activity, store cleaning and bank charges and 60-day payment terms 
were introduced allowing Carrefour to utilise supplier capital (Xu et al., 2014).  It was 
suggested by Wang (2009) that these fees replaced efficiency as a source of profit. In 
Taiwan, some supplier fees were imposed rather than negotiated, became on-going 
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rather than one off charges, and covered a wider range of services and activities than 
was the norm (Hitoshi, 2003).  These practices placed severe pressures on supplier 
margins, consequently several major food manufacturers refused to supply Carrefour.   
Phase 3: Reconfiguring the Global Firm (2012-2016) 
The third phase of divestment from 2012-2016 entails ten departures by five 
companies and represents withdrawal from long-established mature businesses 
(Table 3).  These operations had been active in East Asian markets for an average of 
15.2 years and many of them had evolved into multi-format organisations.  The scale 
of some of these operations is reflected in the value of the divestment transactions.  
Tesco’s departure from South Korea raised a headline price of £4.2 billion, Casino 
received €3.1billion for its Thai operation and €920m for its Vietnamese stores, whilst 
Carrefour raised €525m when its Indonesian subsidiary became a franchise.  As in the 
previous phase – except for Carrefour’s two Singaporean stores which were closed – 
the purchasers were major local or regional market leaders. The value extracted from 
some of these divestments reflects growing competition between these regional 
companies for the store networks. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
The outcome of this phase is further market consolidation and country portfolio 
rationalisation amongst the remaining European grocery retailers, with SHV\Makro 
and Casino departing from the region entirely. Delhaize now trades in a single market 
(Indonesia) with Auchan, Carrefour, Metro and Tesco each present in two markets 
although Carrefour also trades in Indonesia via franchising, and Tesco is represented 
in China through a minority stake in CRE (China Resources Enterprises). In terms of 
country representation, China understandably retains the most European grocery 
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retailers (Auchan, Carrefour and Metro – plus Tesco’s CRE investment), whilst Auchan 
and Carrefour remain in competition in Taiwan, and Delhaize and the Carrefour 
franchise in Indonesia.  In Malaysia and Thailand Tesco is now the sole European 
grocery retailer. 
The pressures for market consolidation – arising from re-regulation, the re-emergence 
of national operators and market resistance – observed in the mid-2000s remained 
during this phase, but with a change in emphasis. Whilst the initial re-regulatory focus 
was on the control of large stores, attention during this phase switched to smaller 
formats as foreign retailers developed multi-format strategies and continued to grow 
market share.  For example, in South Korea moves to protect traditional markets from 
‘conglomerate owned chains’ led to amendments to the Distribution Industry 
Development law in 2010 and 2011, prohibiting the development of modern retail 
formats within 500m (later raised to 1km) of newly established Conventional 
Commerce Preservation Districts (CCPDs) (Cho et al., 2014; 2016). Although ways 
were found to exploit loopholes in the legislation, for example to circumvent the 
ownership definition Tesco-Homeplus established two 49% owned subsidiaries (CVS 
Homeplus and the 365 Plus franchise chain) Kim and Hallsworth (2015) argue that 
their actions, alongside extensive lobbying when the zoning legislation was first 
introduced, were counter-productive as these moves were badly received by civic 
society in South Korea. 
Increased re-regulation undoubtedly impeded performance by changing operating 
costs in what is essentially a high volume, low margin retail sector.  The CCPD zoning 
law in South Korea was followed in 2012 by restrictions on Sunday trading by 
‘conglomerate owned chains’ requiring them to close on the 2nd and 4th Sunday of 
the month (Kim & Hallsworth, 2013; 2015).  As part of the narrative associated with its 
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departure from South Korea, Tesco complained that the introduction of these trading 
restrictions had a £100m impact on annual profits.  
Changes in senior management – often (although not exclusively) triggered by 
investor concerns over performance and financial returns – can have a direct bearing 
on divestment processes.  The arrival of a new CEO or senior management team is 
typically followed by a strategic review of the business.  New senior teams are 
unencumbered by loyalty to decisions made by the previous management, so a 
refocusing of activities or territories is common. The incidence of divestment activity 
appears more evident when external appointments are made for example Lars 
Olofsson and George Plassat at Carrefour and David Lewis at Tesco relative to their 
immediate predecessors (José Luis Duran and Philip Clarke), who were internal 
appointments and therefore might be more emotionally attached to the status quo.  
There is considerable evidence in the third divestment phase of decisions in East Asia 
being in part driven by corporate events in home markets and linked to the arrival of 
new senior management teams. 
Having previously withdrawn from Thailand by selling its stores to Big C (Casino) for 
€868m, Carrefour further retrenched following the arrival of George Plassat as CEO 
with a remit to improve group performance.  International operations were refocused 
during 2012 onto regions where the company held strong positions (Carrefour Annual 
Report, 2012).  In East Asia, it closed its two stores in Singapore, withdrew from 
Malaysia, selling the 26 hypermarkets to AEON of Japan for €250m, and closed a deal 
to sell the remaining 60% share in the Indonesian operation to CT Corp for €525m and 
to switch to a franchise arrangement. 
“The transaction [departure from Singapore] is part of Carrefour’s strategy of 
refocusing on its core activities and allocating its resources to mature 
countries where it occupies strong and established positions and emerging 
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markets where it has strong growth potential” (Carrefour Press Release, 
31/10/2012). 
 
Tesco’s departure from its Japanese operation and the reconfiguration of its Chinese 
business also reflected broader financial pressures within the group (Wood et al., 
2017).  Overall sales performance, not least in the UK, placed the new CEO Philip 
Clarke under severe pressure:  
“We have reviewed our portfolio in Asia and the performance of our business 
in Japan.  Having made considerable efforts in Japan, we have concluded 
that we cannot build a sufficiently scalable business.  We have decided to sell 
our operations there and focus on our larger businesses in the region, in line 
with our priority of driving growth and improving returns” (Tesco Press 
Release, 31/09/2011). 
 
In Japan, a joint venture was created with AEON for a nominal sum before a further 
£40m was injected into the new venture as Tesco withdrew from the business.  In 
China operational control was relinquished in return for a 20% stake (with the option 
to rise to 25% at a later date) in a joint venture controlled by China Resources 
Enterprises (CRE).  The 134 Hymall stores and a financial commitment of £345m 
made up Tesco’s contribution to the new venture (Tesco Press Release 2/10/2013).   
Financial expediency also underpinned Tesco’s unexpected sale of its South Korean 
business.  Tesco Homeplus, described in the 2011 Annual Report (p26) as “a world 
class business”, was widely regarded as a success story having established a leading 
position in the market through close to a thousand owned and franchised stores 
generating £5.4bn in annual sales.  A deterioration in group financial performance and 
an inability to arrest this decline saw the removal of Clarke and the appointment of 
former Unilever executive David Lewis in October 2014.  A strategic review 
established the key corporate priorities as regaining competitiveness in the UK market, 
protecting and strengthening the balance sheet and rebuilding trust and transparency 
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in the business.  The discovery of an £250m “hole” (triggering a Fraud Office 
investigation) delayed the 2015 accounts which contained a series of major write 
downs and impairment charges for property valuations, goodwill, stock and 
commercial income, plus restructuring charges, resulting in a £6.38bn loss.  Many non-
core assets were put up for sale and during this process unsolicited interest was shown 
in the South Korean business. Three major private equity led approaches were 
believed to have bid for Homeplus which was sold to a consortium led by MBK 
Partners (a North Asian firm).  The divestment generated £3.35 billion in cash to be 
used to improve the Group balance sheet by redeeming bonds and other commitments 
due to mature in the next 18 months.   
“The sale realises material value for our shareholders and allows us to make 
significant progress in our strategic priority of protecting and strengthening 
our balance sheet” (Tesco Press Release, 7/9/2015).   
 
A similar fate befell Casino’s East Asian investments. During 2015-16, pressure grew 
on Casino following a series of negative pronouncements from brokers and 
recommendations downgrading the Casino stock. Casino’s strategy and underlying 
financial strength was questioned, with accusations that financial presentation – 
particularly the accumulation of group debt at the holding company level – masked an 
underlying problem in the core business.  These accusations were refuted, but an 
initial deleveraging plan to raise €2billion through external investment in real estate 
assets and the sale of non-core businesses, including the Vietnam operation, was put 
in place (Casino Press Release 15/12/2015; 21/12/2015).  During these divestments, 
expressions of interest in the Big C business in Thailand were received and in 
February 2016 Casino divested its 58% stake to Thai conglomerate TTC Group for 
€3.1billion.  Big C was the second largest grocery chain in Thailand (after Tesco-
Lotus), having purchased Carrefour’s Thai stores in 2010, and traded through 125 
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hypermarkets, 55 supermarkets, 391 convenience stores and 163 health & 
beauty\drugstores. This move was followed in April 2016 by the sale of the Vietnam 
operation to Thailand’s Central Group and its Vietnamese partner Nguyen Kim, 
beating a counter bid from TTC and Lotte (South Korea).  This sale raised a further 
€920m to alleviate Casino’s debt problems. 
Finally, underlying, although less pronounced, financial pressures also contributed to 
Metro’s protracted sale of its 19 Vietnamese stores to TTC holdings: 
“The primary reasons for this decision included a very attractive offer as well 
as good prospects under the new owner” (Metro Annual Report, 2014: 6) 
 
The Metro Group had experienced difficult trading conditions in Europe as austerity 
measures suppressed sales and the share price declined and fell out of the DAX (the 
stock market index for Germany’s 30 largest companies) for the first time.    Failed 
attempts to first merge the Kaufhof department stores with Karstadt, and then to sell 
Kaufhof, and a long running dispute with the founding shareholder of the Media Saturn 
electronics subsidiary which ended up in the courts, contributed to the replacement of 
Eckhard Cordes, the incumbent CEO, with the CFO Olaf Koch in 2011.  A new strategy 
was revealed in 2012 (Metro Group Annual Report, 2012): the East European Real 
hypermarkets were sold to Auchan; and in the cash-and-carry division a number of 
small scale operations (Denmark, Egypt, Greece) were sold or closed and plans to 
enter Indonesia were cancelled.  In Vietnam, an initial deal to sell to Beri Jucker Public 
Company (BJC) had been agreed in mid-2014, but was blocked at the BJC AGM the 
following year.  The BJC majority shareholder, TTC then stepped in to complete the 
deal in January 2016.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Three decades ago East Asia was the latest geographical focus for Europe’s major 
grocery retailers.  The search for emerging markets, characterised by limited local 
competition (in terms of ‘modern’ retailing) and the opportunity for first mover 
advantages, provided an irresistible pull for Europe’s internationally expanding and 
cash-rich grocery chains.  The removal of restrictions on FDI and the growth 
opportunities arising from the late 1990s regional economic crisis created attractions 
which outweighed the challenges of trading in such culturally distant and diverse 
markets. The competitive advantage pursued by European grocery retailers resided 
in the belief that existing business models and ways of operating could be transferred, 
and these business processes would then allow them to out-perform indigenous 
retailers. This initial optimism seems to have dissipated over the years as most of 
these retailers have now retrenched and divested from individual markets and even 
exited the region.   
East Asia provides examples of most of the rationales for, and forms of, divestment 
discussed in the existing literature.  These retail divestment frameworks and the 
associated empirical support are, however, generally static, focusing on a specific 
divestment incident or group of divestments relating to an identified trigger.  In reality 
the retail internationalisation process is highly dynamic, punctuated by periods of 
retrenchment irrespective of experience, market spread, or length of time in and 
familiarity with a host market.  Our aim in this paper was to examine this divestment 
process over a substantial period of time to shift the focus from individual divestment 
incidents and triggers to explore longer term trends and the dynamic interactions 
between contextualised pressures.  
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From our analysis of European grocery retail involvement in East Asia since the late 
1980s, we contend that divestment is stimulated by and reflects different inter-related 
contextual considerations and pressures over time.  The importance of 
contextualisation, institutionalisation and embeddedness has been recognised in 
internationalisation research on market entry and expansion, but these considerations 
are less evident in divestment research.  Whilst some challenges are present 
throughout the period, the relative importance of specific pressures is heightened, the 
combination of pressures varies and the interactions between pressures is intensified 
at different times.  Consideration of this dynamism has been largely absent from 
existing frameworks and represents our theoretical contribution to the divestment 
debate. 
Within East Asia three broad phases can be identified from our analysis during which 
particular factors or combinations of factors appear to dominate.  These differences 
illustrate the value of longitudinal studies in exploring the changing context of decision 
making in international business. The first ‘pioneer adjustment’ divestment phase, 
within a few years of market entry, was characterised by frustrations over an inability 
to take advantage of first mover advantages and rapidly grow scale in some markets.  
The expediency that encouraged market entry across several territories due to the 
regional economic crisis may have compromised due diligence.  Unforeseen costs and 
complications in accessing sites and real estate, alongside deficiencies in prevailing 
channel infrastructures undermined the initial competitive advantages which the 
European grocery retailers expected to exploit.  Institutional differences within East 
Asian markets both constrained the ability of European grocery retailers to expand 
rapidly and required additional investment: rapid expansion was compromised by real 
estate costs and existing regulatory processes; large store formats needed to be 
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physically reconfigured to ‘fit’ local urban environments and consumer behaviours; and 
investment was required to build “basic” channel infrastructure.  Consequently, the 
potential to rapidly exploit first mover advantages in these markets was constrained 
as costs rose and economic conditions depressed sales growth whilst retailers were 
attempting to build store networks. Frustrations were commonly expressed in 
contemporary narratives over unexpected investment requirements, the pace of 
expansion and financial returns on investment.  Decisions were therefore taken to 
withdraw from some markets while sunk costs (in stores and infrastructure) were 
relatively low. 
During the second ‘resistance and market consolidation’ phase of divestment, which 
involved more established businesses usually several years old, both direct and 
institutionally embedded forms of resistance to European grocery retailers generated 
barriers to expansion. After a period of deregulation, primarily to allow FDI and attract 
inward investment – although often stimulated by the “bigger prize” of WTO 
membership – re-regulation (Nguyen et al., 2014) became a constant theme across 
East Asia.  This typically involved restrictions upon large store operators and modern 
forms of retailing under the rhetoric of maintaining “fair” competition and protecting 
indigenous businesses.  Suppliers also resisted aspects of Western supply chain 
processes and practices requiring changes to roles and responsibilities, terms and 
conditions, and payments within the chain. In this environment, opinion formers, such 
as the press, tended to present incoming retailers in a less favourable light, and such 
resistance was often encouraged by the leading incumbent local and regional retailers.  
The emergence of local domestic or regional competitors who appropriated key 
elements of the Western retailers’ approach, and harnessed these to their local 
knowledge, connections and relationships, was also a feature of this divestment phase 
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as many of these operators acquired the assets of the departing European grocery 
retailers.  This resistance, whether overt or tacit, changed the nature of competition at 
the country level and refocused attention on the wider regional market.  Typically, the 
outcome was a market “shake out” as consolidation took place and the stated rationale 
for exit during this period was often framed in terms of under-performance and the 
inability to expand with sufficient pace to build scale or market share alongside the 
increased investment needed to rectify this.  
The third and ongoing phase of divestment – ‘reconfiguring the global firm’ – has been 
dominated by reactions to events outside the immediate East Asian region, and 
impacts upon long established and well embedded businesses. As the European 
retailers’ in-country operations have evolved and grown in the market through multi-
format operations, re-regulation pressures have also encompassed smaller store 
formats and commercial practices.  A more pressing driver, however, appears to be a 
firm level reassessment of global activities and territories.  The impact of the global 
economic recession in Europe and the consequences for domestic performance drew 
attention to the core domestic market and the configuration and financial performance 
of the entire firm. Irrespective of performance or long-term potential, the place of East 
Asia within the firm is overridden when the domestic ‘core’ business comes under 
pressure. A swathe of new senior management and CEO appointments in the wake 
of the European crisis prompted strategic reviews and decision making became firm 
rather than territory-centric.  The opportunity to generate cash from the sale of Asian 
businesses to expanding and increasingly aggressive regional groups provided an 
attractive option for many as the re-regulation and increased indigenous competition 
noted in phase two maintained pressure on sales, cost structures and profitability.  
Home market pressures also become important in understanding why, at the same 
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time as European grocery retailers are in retreat, a range of Japanese retailers in 
response to high levels of domestic competition and saturation are seeking to expand 
into East Asia, and Southeast Asia (Meyer-Ohle, 2014).  A combination of financial 
pressures within the global firm, expectations of stakeholders and attractive often 
unsolicited approaches for existing assets has led to divestment.  
Table 4 provides a summary of our analysis of the dominant divestment pressures and 
the outcomes of the divestment process in each of the identified phases. It illustrates 
the dynamism and variety within international divestment as different combinations of 
divestment pressures and outcome rationales emerge in these phases. In each phase, 
similar underlying pressures can be observed but the nature and importance of these 
pressures differ, reflecting market-specific configurations at different points in time.  
For example, regulatory pressures are evident in all three phases, initially impacting 
as European retailers interacted with existing regulatory systems and learnt to play (or 
circumvent) the system.  Re-regulatory pressures are more significant in phase two 
with policy directed at large stores and modern forms of retailing, the domain of the 
European retailers, and these pressures evolved in phase three to target specific store 
types or locations and operational practices believed to disadvantage indigenous retail 
SMEs. Similarly supply chain related pressures arose initially from disruption to the 
expected effectiveness and efficiency gains anticipated by European retailers, arising 
from unanticipated complexity and additional infrastructure costs in phase one, and in 
phase two related more to overt resistance to practices imposed by the entrants 
leading to objections and complaints about terms and conditions and practices, and 
refusal to supply. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
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Throughout the period under investigation a combination of domestic and local host 
market factors is evident. This manifests itself in the territorial focus of the firm’s 
strategy and its strategic objectives.  In phase one the focus is on the local (host) 
market, regional market considerations appear to play a more important role in the 
divestment process in phase two, and in phase three global considerations and a focus 
on the firm rather than territories come to the fore as domestic market pressures 
prevail even when local subsidiaries have become established and achieved market 
leading positions in the host market.  Over the whole period the same firm can be 
involved in divestment activity, and therefore different combinations of pressures, in 
all three phases. 
Our contribution in this paper has been to conceptualise the dynamic nature of 
divestment in retail internationalisation over time.  This responds to Burgleman’s 
(2011) call for more longitudinal studies in international business.  Our approach is 
also in line with the views of Sayer (1992) concerning contextualised sense making. 
The environmental and institutionalised context within which divestment decisions are 
made within firms is shaped by a combination of host and home market factors which 
interact with organisational priorities and perceptions. Divestment is seen to relate to 
developing lines of resistance in host markets (Coe and Wrigley, 2017) encompassing 
the domains of competitors, consumers, supply networks and regulation and shifting 
home market conditions which impact upon the performance of the entire firm and the 
perceptions of both management and stakeholders.  Whilst many of the commonly 
identified factors that trigger divestment incidents can be observed in the East Asian 
context, the significance of individual factors or combinations of factors changes over 
time.    Similarly, although based on analysis of a single geographical region and single 
retail sector the value of longitudinal analysis of this nature is illustrated in this paper.  
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There is evidence of a threefold pattern of initial readjustment, market consolidation, 
and market maturity types of divestment over this period and a shift in territorial focus 
within firm decision making from the local to the regional and the global.  The nature 
of divestment, the intersecting combination of drivers, and the outcomes of divestment 
are different in each of these periods. Such variety, variation and dynamism needs to 
be incorporated into future studies of international investment and divestment. 
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Figure 1: Entry and Exit Actions by European Grocery Retailers in East Asia, 1986-2016  
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Table 1: Reasons for Country Exit, 1998-2001 
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1998 SHV\Makro KOR 1996 2 4C&C 49 Minority interest operation Wal-Mart (USA)
1998 Promodès TWN 1995 3 1hm 8,100 €62.9m 30 Difference of opinion with partner over strategic direction Far Eastern (TWN)
1999 Ahold CHN 1996 3 40sm 28,600 €43.5m 50 Loss making, limited scale, no prospects of becoming profitable without investment Zhonghui NSFC (CHN)
1999 Ahold SGP 1996 3 14sm 9,847 €72.6m 60 Loss making, limited scale, no prospects of becoming profitable without investment DFI (HK)
1999 Booker THA 1998 1 n/a minority Group financial crisis close to breaching banking covenants  – focus on UK – sell all OS interests Not Known
1999 Booker MYS 1996 3 2C&C £1.7m 40 Group financial crisis close to breaching banking covenants  – focus on UK – sell all OS interests partner
1999 Promodès CHN 1999 <1 1hm 6,300 100 Promodès merger with Carrefour - opening delayed to brand as Carrefour Carrefour (FRA)
1999 Promodès KOR 1999 <1 1hm 100 Promodès merger with Carrefour sees stores absorbed and Continent tradename disappears Carrefour (FRA)
1999 Promodès IDN 1998 1 3hm €25m 80 Promodès merger with Carrefour sees stores absorbed and Continent tradename disappears Carrefour (FRA)
2000 Carrefour HKG 1996 4 4hm €65.6m 100 Constraints on expansion - lack of sites and development laws Closed
2001 Auchan THA 1997 4 1hm 11,000 €7.3m 100 Local legislation - single store – cited changes to store opening legislation Casino (FRA)
Store types: hm = hypermarket; C&C = cash-and-carry, sm = supermarket, cs = convenience store; h&b = health & beauty 
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Table 2: Reasons for Country Exit, 2003-2008 
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2003 Ahold IDN 1997 6 22sm 2,323 €37m €11m 100 Group financial crisis – Review – refocus on US and Europe, divest from non-core activities and Asia Hero (IND)/DFI (HK)
2003 Ahold MYS 1996 7 33sm 4,366 €85m n/a 100 Group financial crisis – Review – refocus on US and Europe, divest from non-core activities and Asia Giant/DFI (HK)
2003 Delhaize SGP 1999 4 33sm+2cs 37,889 €140.4m €21.9m 49 Approach and attractive offer, plus scale\greater potential elsewhere in Asia Cold Storage/DFI (HK)
2003 SHV\Makro TWN 1990 13 8C&C written off 100 Continued losses, no sign of recovery despite new management – tried to sell then close Closed
2004 Ahold THA 1997 7 47sm+wholesale 10,777 €313m (€18m) 100 Group financial crisis – Review – refocus on US and Europe, divest from non-core activities and Asia Central Group (THA)
2004 Delhaize THA 1997 7 36sm 36,385 (€8.5m) 100 Loss making and scale of investment needed to become profitable, sell and close 5 stores Central Group (THA)
2005 Carrefour JPN 2000 5 8hm 75,000 €72m 100 Part of Review  – sell insufficiently profitable assets –franchise tradename and supply PB AEON (JPN)
2005 Spar SGP 2003 2 Contract Not Known Not Known
2006 Tesco TWN 2000 5 6hm 44,965 £108m swop 100 No detailed explanation – about building scale from swop (Czech & Slovak for Taiwan) Carrefour (FRA)
2006 Carrefour KOR 1996 10 31hm 280,000 €1,500m 100 No specific reason given E-Land (KOR)
2006 Casino TWN 1998 8 14 hm 90,000 €163m 50 Performance, not leadership position, sold to partner “non-strategic asset disposal programme” Far Eastern (TWN)
2006 SHV\Makro MYS 1993 13 8C&C £73m 65 Performance - "intense competitive pressure" and re-focus of Asian activities Tesco (GBR)
2007 SHV\Makro CHN 1996 11 4C&C €122m 49 Re-focus on key markets – not developing quickly enough Lotte (KOR)
2007 SHV\Makro PHL 1996 11 15C&C 40 Re-focus on key markets – legal, fiscal, economic barriers to sustainable business SM Investments (PHL)
2008 SHV\Makro IDN 1992 16 19C&C €305m €246m 84 Re-focus on key markets – new management team put in place 2006, no improvement Lotte (KOR)
Store types: hm = hypermarket; C&C = cash-and-carry, sm = supermarket, cs = convenience store; h&b = health & beauty 
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Table 3: Reasons for Country Exit, 2012-2016 
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2012 Carrefour SGP 1997 15 2hm 16,000 100 Plassat Review – market position not strong enough\limited growth potential Closed
2012 Carrefour MYS 1994 18 26hm 173,000 €250m 100 Plassat Review – market position not strong enough\limited growth potential AEON (JPN)
2012 Tesco JPN 2003 9 140sm&cs 46,196 £476m (€40m) 100 Performance –  makes losses and can’t build sufficiently scale-able business AEON (JPN)
2013 Carrefour IDN 1998 15 71hm+13sm 449,000 €701m 60 Plassat Review – market position not strong enough\limited growth potential – to franchise CT Corp (IDN)
2013 SHV\Makro THA 1989 24 57C&C 49 No reason – but last Asian operation and focus on LATIM CP Group (THA)
2014 Tesco CHN 2004 10 117hm+14other 945,659 £1,423m (£345m) 100 Cost of expansion and returns, move to cautious approach and scale back through venture CRE (CHN)
2014 Metro VNM 2002 12 19C&C €655m 100 Attractive offer, provides better growth prospects (although retrenching from some markets) BJC/TTC (VNM)
2015 Tesco KOR 1999 16 424own+543fran 1,542,237 £5,383m £4,240m 100 Domestic problems – need to raise cash to bolster balance sheet Investors (KOR)
2016 Casino THA 1998 18
125hm+55sm              
+391cs+163h&b
1,102,000 €3,400m €3,100m 58.6 Debt problems at home – withdraw from Asia – focus on France and LATIM TTC (THA)
2016 Casino VNM 2001 15 152hm+2cs 155,000 €586m €920m 100 Debt problems at home – withdraw from Asia – focus on France and LATIM Central Group (THA)
Store types: hm = hypermarket; C&C = cash-and-carry, sm = supermarket, cs = convenience store; h&b = health & beauty 
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Table 4: Dynamic Divestment Pressures and Outcomes 
Phase Pioneer Adjustment Resistance and Market Consolidation Reconfiguring  the Global Firm 
    
Dominant 
Divestment 
Pressures 
Adjusting to Market Norms 
 additional\unanticipated costs 
 reactions to consumer 
expectations & behaviours 
 format adaptations 
 site acquisition costs and delays 
 
Re-Regulation Response 
 protectionist agenda 
 directly targeted regulation 
 controls over large stores 
 controls over ‘modern retailing’ 
 
Global (European) Financial Crisis  
 pressures on domestic markets 
 investor expectations & stockbroker 
pressures 
 new (external) management teams  with 
‘recovery’ remits 
 Supply Chain Investments 
 unexpected complexity 
 inadequate existing infrastructure  
 expected efficiencies 
unobtainable 
Supplier Resistance 
 rejection of terms & conditions 
 unfair practices 
 refusal to supply 
 complaints to public authorities 
 
Regional Ambitions of Regional Competition 
 proactive moves for assets 
 acquirers not acquired 
 willing to compete for and pay a premium 
for assets 
 
 Coping with Existing Regulations 
 interaction with existing systems  
 delays in expansion 
 engagement in game playing 
(Re)emergence of Local Competition 
 influence with local stakeholders 
(press, suppliers, political) 
 stronger local competition 
 ‘buy back’ of assets and shareholdings 
 
Re-Regulation Activities 
 controls over smaller stores 
 controls over competitive \operating 
processes 
Focus and 
Outcomes 
Local Market Refinement 
 additional sunk costs and delays 
 unable to achieve expected first 
mover advantages as quickly as 
desired 
 invest elsewhere in region 
 
Regional Market Consolidation  
 resistance impacting on business 
model, unable to maximise efficiencies 
 regional (key) market concentration 
rather than market spreading 
 
Global Market Rationalisation 
 corporate returns on investment 
 cashing in on asset sales 
 focus on wider firm not individual 
markets or regions 
 divest perceived ‘peripheral’ activities 
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